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article covers state cases from 314 S.W.3d through 374 S.W.3d

and federal cases during the same time period that the authors
believe are noteworthy for adding to the jurisprudence on the applicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
There were a few "landmark" cases in real property law during the
current Survey period, and there were a number of otherwise significant
cases. Unfortunately, the more significant cases create confusion and consternation rather than resolution of legal doctrines. In particular, the decisions concerning constructive notice are among the most important and
imperative. The Texas Supreme Court extended a strict reading of waiver
and "as is" clauses. The Texas Supreme Court also wrestled with difficult
title issues along waterways and the ocean. Finally, the Texas Supreme
Court confirmed and applied the rule of capture to groundwater.
II.

MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES
A.

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE

In a case of first impression, Noble Mortgage & Investments, LLC v. D
& M Vision Investments, LLC1 addresses whether noting a foreclosure
sale on an execution document pursuant to Rule 656 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure constitutes constructive notice for purposes of the
Texas Recording Act. 2 In Noble, the Houston Court of Appeals looked at
two competing chains of title and analyzed the constructive notice provisions of the Texas Recording Act.3 The subject property was owned by
Kenneth Banks (Banks) on March 23, 2006. Banks conveyed the property
to Houston Kaco, Inc., which obtained a refinancing loan from Noble on
October 9, 2007, and the Noble deed of trust was recorded on November 2, 2007. After two payments, the Noble deed of trust went into default and was foreclosed in January 2008. The second chain of title
derived from a judgment obtained by Financial Holdings, Inc. against
1. Noble Mortg. & Invs., LLC v. D & M Vision Invs., LLC, 340 S.W.3d 65 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
2. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (West 2013); TEX. R. Civ. P. 656.
3. See Noble, 340 S.W.3d at 71-76.
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Banks on October 30, 2006.4 The date of this judgment was during the
time that Banks owned the property sandwiched between ownerships by
Houston Kaco, Inc. Financial Holdings did not file an abstract of judgment in the real property records; however, it did obtain an execution
and order of sale on July 5, 2007, which resulted in a constable's sale on
September 4, 2007. The successful bidder was the predecessor to D & M
Vision Investments (D & M). The return of execution was filed in the
litigation records of the court on September 11, 2007. Over two months
later, on November 14, 2007, the constable delivered a deed on such sale,
which contained defects in the grantee's name. On December 31, 2007,
the corrected deed was filed in the real property records, after the Noble
deed of trust was recorded.
When the two parties discovered the competing claims of title, suit was
initiated, and the trial court awarded title to D & M. 5 On appeal of that
judgment, Noble argued it was a good faith purchaser without notice. 6
The appellate court ruling addressed whether Noble had constructive notice of the intervening constable's sale.7 First, D & M argued that Noble
did not acquire title in good faith because Noble did not check the court
records for the constable's sale. Specifically, D & M asserted that the
recording of a sale on the execution document in compliance with
Rule 656 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is a recording for purposes of constructive notice under the Texas Recording Act.8 The parties
and the appellate court acknowledged this to be a matter of first impression and addressed various aspects of the interpretation of the Texas Recording Act's notice provisions. 9 In concluding that a recording under
Rule 656 is not a recording for purposes of importing constructive knowledge as to a real property claim, the court of appeals took notice of numerous prior cases where litigation records did not constitute
constructive notice as to real property interests, referencing judgments
recorded only in court minutes, court judgments partitioning real property recorded only in the court's minutes, divorce decrees transferring
real property, and court orders of partition.10 Any other such interpretation, the court of appeals reasoned, would contradict 150 years of Texas
statutory law, case law, and title practice." Further, the court of appeals
noted that it was a "'well-established rule that a deed or instrument lying
outside of [the] chain of title imports no notice."' 12 Additionally, the
court of appeals relied upon Texas Property Code, Chapter 52, concerning abstract of money judgments, which provides the statutory framework
4. Id. at 68.
5. Id. at 71-72.
6. Id. at 74.
7. Id. at 77-78.
8. Id. at 77.
9. Id. at 77-78.
10. Id. at 78-82.
11. Id. at 79.
12. Id. at 81 (quoting Nguyen v. Chapa, 305 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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in which notice of judgment liens can constitute constructive notice, and
confirmed that: (1) no lien is created by the mere rendition of a judgment,
and (2) the judgment creditor's first step in creating a judicial lien is to
obtain an abstract of the judgment. 13
In Noble, the losing claimant made a number of fatal mistakes that
should be noted by practitioners. First, no abstract of judgment was obtained and filed on the October 30, 2006, judgment lien by Financial
Holdings.14 Secondly, when the erroneous constable deed was obtained,
it was not recorded even with the error in the grantee name.' 5 Prudent
practice would have suggested the recording of the deed immediately
with a correction deed to be recorded when available. Even the inaccuracies in the grantee's name would have put third parties on constructive
notice of a competing claim. This failure allowed the existing Noble deed
of trust to be recorded between the successful bid at the constable's sale
and the ultimate recording of the corrected constable's deed. Third, in
dicta, the court of appeals noted that possession of the disputed property
can operate as constructive notice of a competing party's claim.16 While
D & M did post a no trespass sign, it did not take action to obtain possession immediately and did not properly perfect a possession claim at the
trial court. While the possession strategy could be overlooked, the other
two defects are mistakes a skilled real estate practitioner would not
make.17

To the opposite effect as to court records not being constructive notice
is the per curiam opinion in Wind Mountain Ranch, LLC v. City of Temple.'8 A deed of trust was executed by Robert K. Utley (Utley) with a
1993 maturity date.19 The property was acquired by Centex prior to the
maturity date and Centex filed bankruptcy proceedings in 1992.20 The
bankruptcy court confirmed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, which extended the maturity date to 1999, and issued an order to that effect. 2 1
Neither the reorganization plan nor the confirmation order were filed in
the real property records. 22 Due to municipal code violations, the City of
Temple (the City) obtained a judgment against Centex and recorded an
abstract of judgment in 2003.23 Subsequently, the note and deed of trust
were assigned to Wind Mountain Ranch, which conducted a nonjudicial
13. Id. (citing Wilson v. Dvorak, 228 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007,
pet. denied) and TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.002 (West 2007)).
14. Id. at 77.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 82.
17. How the trial court could overlook the long history of constructive notice cases
under Texas law in reaching its judgment is concerning to this author; but see Wind Mountain Ranch, LLC v. City of Temple, 333 S.W.3 580 (Tex. 2010).
18. Wind Mountain Ranch, LLC v. City of Temple, 333 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2010).
19. Id. at 581.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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foreclosure sale. 24 The foreclosure sale occurred after the note's fouryear statute of limitations had lapsed.2 5 The City brought a declaratory
action, claiming that the maturity date was never filed of record and
therefore the nonjudicial foreclosure was void.26 The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the City, and the Amarillo Court of Appeals
affirmed. 27
Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.035(a), a party must
bring suit for recovery of real property within four years after the date
the cause of action accrues. 2 8 But the statute of limitation period may be
suspended by an extension agreement that is signed and acknowledged
by the parties and filed for record in the county clerk's office. 29 Furthermore, bona fide purchaser status is provided to any purchaser who takes
the real property without actual notice of the extension agreement and
before the extension agreement is signed, acknowledged, filed, and recorded.30 The Texas Supreme Court, purporting to rely on the plain language of the Code, concluded that the plain language imposes no
requirement for recordation of an extension agreement on a bankruptcy
court order. 3 ' This position of the supreme court is ludicrous. Such a position flies in the face of 150 years of Texas law on constructive notice and
is directly contrary to the position taken by the Houston First District
Court of Appeals in Noble, as reported above. 32 First, the plain language
of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.037 provides that an extension agreement is void as to lienholders without actual notice of the extension agreement.3 3 Second, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§ 16.036(a) clearly requires that a party to a debt secured by a real property lien must follow the provisions of that section to extend the limitation period, including the recordation of the extension agreement. 34
Texas courts have historically held that judgments and orders in civil litigation proceedings do not constitute constructive notice under the Texas
Recording Act.35 This decision, if not overturned, will create a new burden on parties in real estate transactions. Under existing precedent, the
county litigation files would not need to be searched to determine competing real property interests; however, bankruptcy matters throughout
the entire United States would have to be searched. Recall that in this
case, the bankruptcy proceeding affecting the Bell County property took
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Wind Mountain Ranch, LLC v. City of Temple, 333 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2008), rev'd 333 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2010).
28. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE AN. § 16.035(a) (West 2013).
29. Id. § 16.036(b).
30. Id. § 16.037.
31. Wind Mountain Ranch, 333 S.W.3d at 582.
32. See Noble Mortg. & Invs., LLC v. D & M Vision Invs., LLC., 340 S.W.3d 65 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
33. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE AN. § 16.037.
34. Id. § 16.036(a).
35. See material cited in n.12 of this article for a discussion of prior case law.
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place in the Central District of California.36 Consequently, until this case
is clarified or overturned, the only safe practice for real estate practitioners (including title companies) is to obtain searches of all bankruptcy filings with respect to the applicable owner of a real property interest.

B.

TAX LIENS

Genesis Tax Loan Services, Inc. v. Kothmann addressed certain details
and requirements of the transfer of a tax lien.37 The principal issue was
whether a verified photocopy of the lien transfer could be recorded in
lieu of the original tax lien transfer.3 8 The appellate court determined
that a verified photocopy was invalid,3 9 as the authors discussed in the
2010 Survey. 40 Here, the Texas Supreme Court overruled such holding, 41
as predicted in the 2010 Survey. Genesis had paid the outstanding ad
valorem taxes and received the statutory required authorization from the
owner and certification payment from the taxing authority. Since the
original document had been lost, Genesis recorded a photocopy attached
to an affidavit signed by Genesis's president. The supreme court confirmed such practice, relying on Texas Rules of Evidence Rule 1003,
which allows a duplicate document to be admitted unless questions of
authenticity are raised. 42 The supreme court further noted that the tax
lien statute did not contain any basis for not accepting a verified duplicate, and common sense would dictate the same. 43
In other ancillary issues, the supreme court determined that because
the county clerk did not have an official seal of office at the time of the
tax lien transfer, the use of an acknowledgment before a notary, whose
seal was affixed, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory seal requirement. 44
The supreme court did not specifically address the question of whether a
notary seal was sufficient if the county clerk actually possessed an official
seal of office; but the clear implication is that the alternative use of an
acknowledgment notary seal would not be acceptable if the tax collector
has an official seal. 4 5 This should serve as a caution to all practitioners to
verify that the tax collector's seal is affixed without concurrent proof
(preferably by affidavit) that an official seal does not exist at the time of
the certification.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
(2010).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Wind Mountain Ranch, 333 S.W.3d at 581.
Genesis Tax Loan Servs., Inc. v. Kothmann, 339 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 106.
Id.
J. Richard White & G. Roland Love, Real Property, 63 SMU L. REv. 757, 760-62
Genesis Tax Loan Servs., 339 S.W.3d at 111.
Id. at 109 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 1003).
Id.
Id. at 110.
See id.
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SERVICER

Another case of first impression is ECF North Ridge v. Orix Capital
Markets, which addressed whether a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) loan servicer had standing to sue a mortgagor for breach of
contract. 46 A loan was made to TCI on a medical building in Los Angeles, California, that was pooled with other loans in a typical CMBS-style
transaction. 47 The loan was owned by a securitization trust and serviced
by Orix Capital Markets (Orix) pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing
Agreement (the Agreement), a typical and fairly standardized document
in the CMBS industry.4 8 The loan, originated in 1999, required "all-risk"
insurance. 49 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, many insurance companies excluded terrorism coverage from all-risk policies.5 0
In 2002, Orix demanded that TCI obtain certified terrorism insurance, as
authorized under the relevant loan documents.51 When TCI failed to obtain the requisite insurance, Orix declared a default and sued for breach
of contract. 52 In defense, TCI alleged that Orix, as a mortgage servicer
but not a holder of the note, had no standing to sue.5 3
The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that no Texas cases had directly
addressed such standing issue, although there was a supporting Texas case
and a recent federal circuit court case directly on point,54 and relied heavily on CWCapital.5 5 "Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction," which focuses on whether the party to the lawsuit has a justiciable
interest in the outcome. 5 6 In essence, the court of appeals adopted the
reasoning and conclusions from CWCapital,57 which reviewed the contractual obligations between a servicer and trustee (the owner) of the
CMBS loan pool.5 8 In CWCapital, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
servicer, although not an assignee, had a personal stake in the outcome of
the lawsuit because it received a percentage of the proceeds of a defaulted loan that it serviced.5 9 In the subject case, the court of appeals
never addressed whether the servicer received benefits from the proceeds
of the defaulted loan; rather, it focused on the duties and responsibilities
46. ECF N. Ridge Assocs., L.P. v. ORIX Capital Mkts., L.L.C., 336 S.W.3d 400 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied).
47. Id. at 402.
48. Id. at 403.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 404.
54. Id. at 405 (referencing Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. La Villita Motor Inns, J.V., 329
S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) and CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC
v. Chicago Props., LLC, 610 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2010)).
55. Id. at 405-07.
56. Id. at 405.
57. Id. at 407.
58. CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC, 610 F.3d at 499-500.
59. ECF N. Ridge, 336 S.W.3d at 406 (citing CWCapitalAsset Mgmt., LLC, 610 F.3d at
501).
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delegated by a trust to the servicer under the pooling and servicing agreement. 60 In both cases, the trust delegated the duty and responsibility to
the servicer to file suit against a borrower and to take other servicing and
administrative actions the servicer deemed necessary and desirable, as
well as the duty of the trust to provide support to the servicer in the
servicer's exercise of such duties. 61 The CWCapital court characterized
the securitization trust as holding bare legal title with the pooling and
servicing agreement, specifically delegating effective equitable ownership
of claims to the servicer. 62 Based on these contractual provisions, the
court concluded that the CMBS servicer had standing to bring a lawsuit
against a defaulting borrower. 63 In a footnote, the court rebuffed TCI's
argument that standing required a showing of either third-party beneficiary status or privity, concluding that the cited cases did not control in
circumstances where a pooling and servicing agreement specifically delegate to the servicer the rights and responsibilities to institute suit.64

D.

SUBSTITUTE

TRUSTEE AS PARTY TO A SUIT

In another case of first impression, Marsh v. Wells Fargo Bank,65 the
federal circuit court addressed the basis for dismissal of a substitute trustee from a lawsuit involving a foreclosure pursuant to Texas Property
Code § 51.007.66 In Marsh, the plaintiff obtained a loan against his home
from Wells Fargo. Based on an alleged default, Wells Fargo accelerated
the note and posted the property for foreclosure. The plaintiff added as
additional defendants to the suit the law firm representing Wells Fargo
and the four substitute trustees named in the foreclosure documents.
Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the law firm and the substitute trustees from the lawsuit pursuant to Texas Property Code § 51.007, which
provides that a trustee may plead and answer that it is not a necessary
party based on its belief that the trustee was named solely in its capacity
as a trustee under a deed of trust. 67 In addressing the dismissal of the law
firm, the court concluded that the law firm was not subject to dismissal
since the law firm was not itself named as a substitute trustee. 68 However,
the court concluded that the individuals named as substitute trustees
were governed by that statute and proceeded to analyze the requirements
for dismissal of the substitute trustees.69 The plaintiff alleged that the
substitute trustees stated in their verified denial that they had a reasonable belief that they were named solely in their capacity as trustees; however, they did not state the basis for that belief, which was the issue
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 406-07.
Id. at 405-07.
CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC, 610 F.3d at 501-02.
ECF N. Ridge, 336 S.W.3d at 407.
Id. at 407 n.2.
Marsh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 760 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.007 (West 2007).
Marsh, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 705-06 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.007).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707-08.
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addressed by the court.7 0 Looking at the plain language of the statute, 7 '
the court concluded that the unambiguous provisions of the statute required the statement of a basis and not merely a recitation of the trustee's
belief, specifying that the statute "requires a trustee to state the reason or
justification for the trustee's reasonable belief, rather than swear to the
mere fact of that belief."72 The court did not provide any further details
as to the scope of the basis, the content thereof, or any other applicable
factors.73 However, it appears that virtually any reason or justification for
the "reasonable belief" would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. Therefore, practitioners should be careful to include such
statements of reason or justification in any such pleading.
E.

FORECLOSURE PREREQUISITES

In another case of first impression, Knapik v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, a federal court addressed whether an apartment characterized
as a "weekend home" qualified as a debtor's residence. 74 Knapik obtained financing for a multiple-apartment building of which he used one
apartment as a "weekend home" while renting the other apartments to
tenants. Upon a default and foreclosure action, Knapik brought suit alleging that the lender did not comply with the requirements under Texas
foreclosure law to provide a notice and twenty-day cure period for property which is the debtor's residence.7 5 The district court determined that
no Texas court had addressed this particular issue and analyzed unrecorded published opinions to reach the conclusion that Texas Property
Code § 51.002(d) does not apply to an apartment building in which the
debtor allegedly uses one of the units as a "weekend home."76 The court
concluded that the Texas Legislature intended the statute to apply to only
one residence and that it should be the current primary residence of the
debtor.7 7 Further, the court reasoned that a mortgagee would not know
that a debtor was using an apartment unit as his residence.78
III.
A.

DEBTOR/CREDITOR

COMMITMENT BREACH, PARTIES, AND DAMAGES

The Texas Supreme Court, in Basic CapitalManagement, Inc. v. Dynex
Commercial Inc., considered who was a third-party beneficiary of a loan
70. Id.
71. The applicable provisions of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.007 provide: "The trustee .. . may plead in the answer that [it] is not a necessary party by a verified denial stating
the basis for the trustee's reasonable belief that [it] was named . .. solely in the capacity as
a trustee . . . ." Marsh, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (emphasis and alterations in original).
72. Id.
73. See id at 707-08.
74. Knapik v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 825 F. Supp. 2d 869 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
75. Id. at 870 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (West 2007)).
76. Id. at 871.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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commitment that was breached and whether consequential damages were
reasonably foreseeable. 79 American Realty Trust (ART) and Transcontinental Realty Investors (TCI) were publically traded real estate investment trusts that owned commercial properties managed by Basic Capital
Management (Basic). 80 Dynex entered into an agreement (the New Orleans Agreement) with TCI for loans on three commercial buildings in New
Orleans, with each building to be owned by a single asset bankruptcy
remote entity (SABRE) created by TCI.8 Additionally, Dynex provided
a loan commitment (Commitment) to Basic, who agreed to form other
single asset bankruptcy remote entities to borrow $160,000,000 over a
two-year period with respect to commercial projects not yet known. The
New Orleans Agreement was with TCI and the Commitment was with
Basic. 8 2 Dynex made the loan for the three New Orleans buildings to the
single asset bankruptcy remote entities formed by TCI and funded
$6,000,000 to Basic under the Commitment.83 Soon thereafter, market
conditions deteriorated causing interest rate increases, which made the
terms of the Commitment unfavorable to Dynex, and Dynex later refused
to provide further funding under both the New Orleans Agreement and
Commitment. 84
ART and TCI sued Dynex for breach of the Commitment, alleging lost
profits and increased financing costs. 85 The appellate court concluded
that ART and TCI were not third-party beneficiaries and not entitled to
bring suit.86 The Texas Supreme Court granted petition for review and
focused on whether ART and TCI were third-party beneficiaries entitled
to sue for breach of the Commitment and request lost profits as consequential damages.87 The supreme court noted that third-party beneficiary
law is well settled, stating "[a] third party may recover on a contract made
between other parties only if the parties intended to secure some benefit
to that third party, and only if the contracting parties entered into the
contract directly for the third party's benefit."88 Therefore, intent of the
parties is the controlling interest, and so the supreme court addressed
whether the facts and circumstances supported such intent of the parties. 89 First, the Commitment's purpose was specified to be for the future
financing of commercial properties for ART and TCI, which Basic would
manage and in which ART and TCI would have an ownership interest. 90
79. Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Commercial Inc., 348 S.W.3d 894, 896 (Tex.
2011).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 896-97.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 897.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Basic Capital Mgmt. v. Dynex Commercial, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008), rev'd, 348 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. 2011).
87. Dynex Commercial, 348 S.W.3d at 898.
88. Id. at 900.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Basic's business was the management of properties owned by those investment trusts, a fact known by Dynex. 9 1 The single asset bankruptcy
remote entities were to be formed by ART and TCI who would hold an
ownership interest therein, further noting that the reason for the formation of the single asset bankruptcy remote entities was for the exclusive
benefit of Dynex.92 Second, the supreme court noted that any such single
asset bankruptcy remote entities would not be created until an actual investment opportunity presented itself, and it would be unreasonable to
expect their creation for the sole purpose of bringing suit for breach of
the Commitment.9 3 The supreme court distinguished the subject entity
structure from that of a corporate parent; even though a corporate parent
is generally not a third-party beneficiary of its subsidiaries, the explicit
nature of the subject transaction and structure was to ensure the benefit
of ART and TCI as owners of such single asset bankruptcy remote entities. 94 The role of ART and TCI was vital to, and clearly delineated in,
the transaction between Dynex and Basic as evidenced by the Commitment.95 As to the New Orleans Agreement, TCI was determined to be a
third-party beneficiary where it was actually the party to the New Orleans
Agreement, even though the loans pursuant thereto were made to three
separate single asset bankruptcy remote entities. 96
With respect to consequential damages for breach, the supreme court
recognized foreseeability as a fundamental prerequisite to recovery of
consequential damages. 97 The lender argued in the lower court and
before the supreme court that it was unaware of what specific investments Basic would propose or what alternative financings would be available. 98 This argument was brushed aside because no authority was
presented for the proposition that a lender's breach of a loan commitment could not have reasonably foreseeable consequences unless the
lender knew the nature of the intended use of funds and the specific venture in which it would be utilized. 99 Under these circumstances, the supreme court concluded that liability for consequential damages was
warranted for a commitment breach if the lender knew at the time of
commitment "the nature of the borrower's intended use of the loan proceeds but not the details of the intended venture."10 0 Dynex clearly knew
how funds from the Commitment would be used and that if market conditions deteriorated and interest rates rose, it would have a negative effect on Basic, all of which reflected the foreseeability of consequences. 10 1
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id.
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The problems presented in this case could have been avoided by simply
restructuring the Commitment. First, the Commitment could have been
addressed to and signed by the principal parties as "agents for" the "to be
formed" special asset bankruptcy remote entities. Secondly, to evidence
the intention of the parties as to who are third-party beneficiaries, simply
including a statement that the principal parties are third-party beneficiaries also would have avoided that issue. These are good reminders to
the practitioner on the details for drafting.
B.

PREPAYMENT PROVISIONS

In Young v. Gumfory, a prepayment provision was interpreted by the
Dallas Court of Appeals.1 02 Gumfory purchased land from Young who
financed the purchase with a note and deed of trust.103 The note contained a prepayment provision providing that the debtor "may prepay
this note in any amount at any time before the Maturity Date without
penalty or premium."1 04 After a few years, Gumfory decided to payoff
the note early and requested confirmation of the prepayment amount. 0 5
Young provided an amount that exceeded Gumfory's expected amount
by approximately twenty-five percent.106 After further consideration of
the amount, Gumfory twice tendered the smaller amount on condition
that it was full payment and the deed of trust lien should be released.107
Ultimately, Gumfory made a third tender without any conditions, stating
that the tender was "payment of unpaid principal and accrued interest ...
and . . . is a prepayment of principal as allowed by the [Note]." 0 8 The

appellate court rendered summary judgment in favor of Gumfory, noting
that whether the tendered amount was in full satisfaction of the debt was
irrelevant because the note allowed for prepayment in any amount.109
This case demonstrates the need for a practitioner to draft and review
prepayment provisions with care to assure that the intended result is
accomplished.
IV. GUARANTY/INDEMNITIES
A.

JURY WAIVERS

In re Go Colorado 2007 Revocable Trust addressed the enforceability
of a jury waiver provision under certain unique circumstances.11 0 Center
Capital Corporation made a loan that was guaranteed by Obert and
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Young v. Gumfory, 322 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 742.

110. In re Go Colo. 2007 Revocable Trust, 319 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth

2010, no pet.).
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others.1 1' The guaranty contained a waiver of a jury trial, and that provision is the subject of this case.11 2 A default on the loan occurred and the
lender sued the guarantors.11 3 The lender added the Go Colorado 2007
Revocable Trust (Trust) as a party defendant in the guaranty suit;114 however, there is no mention in the opinion as to how and why the Trust was
added as a defendant, a peculiarity this author believes is critical to fully
understanding the case. The trial court enforced the contractual jury
waiver against the Trust, and the Trust appealed seeking mandamus
against the trial court for abuse of discretion.11 5 Preliminarily, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals addressed mandamus, stating that it is available
where parties have no adequate remedy by appeal, and it concluded that
the enforcement or nonenforcement of a contractual jury waiver provision was such a case.11 6 The enforceability of a jury trial waiver requires
that the waiver be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently."17
However, when the subject guaranty was executed, the Trust had not yet
been created; therefore, the court of appeals concluded that it was legally
impossible for the Trust to have made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver when it did not exist." 8 Reaching this conclusion, the court
of appeals ignored the lender's argument that Obert, as a trustee of the
Trust, had a close nexus with the Trust and his individual waiver should
be imputed to the Trust, as well as case law regarding arbitration agreement provisions enforced against nonsignatory parties and other equities
asserted by the lender.119
By way of dicta, the opinion provides that if evidence that the Trust
was an assignee of a guarantor had been established, a different result
may have occurred.120 In fact, the guaranty contained a provision that
made it binding on successors and assigns.121 What is puzzling about this
decision is the total lack of information on how a lender could sue the
Trust, which was not a party to the original guaranty. The only feasible
explanation is that the Trust was either an assignee or had assumed or
ratified the obligations of the guaranty by some subsequent document.
The fact that this is not discussed in the case seems to indicate a failure on
the part of the lender to provide appropriate evidence of why the Trust
was named as a guarantor party defendant.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

881-82.
882.

883.
884.
884 n.4.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

In TranscontinentalRealty Investors, Inc. v. Orix CapitalMarkets, LLC,
the creditor filed a declaratory judgment action against a guarantor in
order to shorten its collection timeframe.122 Though the trial court
awarded relief under the declaratory judgment action, the Dallas Court
of Appeals determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the
controversy was not ripe for review. 123 Transcontinental executed a guaranty covering payment of legal fees incurred by Orix in a suit against
TCI, a subsidiary of Transcontinental.1 2 4 The guaranty would be triggered
upon the award of legal fees in another litigation action between Orix
and TCI.125 In its declaratory action, the lender requested a determination that Transcontinental was liable for the attorneys's fees ultimately
awarded in the other case and that all affirmative defenses to the guaranty be extinguished.12 6 Subject matter jurisdiction exists only where a
dispute is ripe, and the court of appeals stated that a case is not ripe if its
resolution depends on contingent facts or upon events that have yet to
come to pass.127 Since the underlying case for determining legal fees had
not yet been decided, and affirmative defenses depended upon facts in
addition to those existing at the time of the contract formation, it was
premature to determine any extinguishment of the affirmative defenses.128 This case represents a good lesson to practitioners to avoid
"short circuiting" the appropriate breach of contract suit on a guaranty by
filing a declaratory judgment action.
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A.

PREVAILING PARTY AND LEGAL FEES

A typical boilerplate provision awarding attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" was discussed in Epps v. Fowler.12 9 Fowler purchased a house
from Epps and brought suit after discovering foundation issues. During
the course of the litigation, Fowler filed a notice of nonsuit without
prejudice.130 An issue developed as to whether Epps was entitled to attorney's fees under the standard Texas Real Estate Commission form
contract, which provided that attorney's fees would be awarded to the
"prevailing party in any legal proceeding related to the contract."131 The
Texas Supreme Court acknowledged existing judicial decisions awarding
122. Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc. v. Orix Capital Mkts., LLC, 353 S.W.3d 241,
242-43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied).
123. Id. at 245-46.
124. Id. at 242.
125. Id. at 243; see n.46 of this article discussing other litigation regarding a dispute as to
whether the debtor should purchase terrorism insurance.
126. Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 353 S.W.3d at 243.
127. Id. at 244.
128. Id. at 245.
129. Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011).
130. Id. at 865.
131. Id.

2013]

Real Property

1095

attorney's fees when claims were dismissed "with prejudice"; however,
the issue in connection with a nonsuit without prejudice had not yet been
addressed. 132 The supreme court held that when a plaintiff takes a nonsuit without prejudice, the defendant may be the prevailing party "if the
trial court determines, on the defendant's motion, that the nonsuit was
taken to avoid an unfavorable ruling on the merits." 133
However, a compelling dissenting opinion reasoned that the majority
relied too heavily on judicial policy rationale and federal cases interpreting statutory schemes, and instead it should have relied on the plain language and meaning of "prevailing party," which the dissent takes from a
dictionary. 134 So, momentarily there is an answer to this issue, but the
dissenting opinion points out the main lesson for the practitioner: "[T]he
Court forces parties who desire a broader fee-shifting agreement .

.

. to

use clearer words than 'prevailing party' . . . [, and] [t]o be safe, parties
will have to spell out their intentions in more detail."135
Fitzgerald v. Schroeder Ventures II, LLC is also a case discussing the
prevailing party for attorney's fees. 136 Schroeder bought land from Pratt
and Panzarella, as trustees, who were represented by Fitzgerald, the real
estate broker.13 7 After the closing, Schroeder sued the sellers and the
broker for not disclosing the existence of a sink hole adjacent to the property.1 38 The jury found in favor of the sellers and brokers, who had asserted rights to attorney's fees as the prevailing party.139 The trial court
refused to award attorney's fees based on the decision in KB Homes.140
In the subject decision, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and
rendered attorney's fees in favor of the seller and broker. 141 The decision
in KB Homes was inapplicable to the subject case because KB Homes
involved a request by the plaintiff for affirmative relief, and while the
plaintiff received judgment, it received a no-damage award; therefore,
KB Homes was not a prevailing party and could not recover attorney's
fees. 142 In Fitzgerald,the court of appeals distinguished the requirements
for a defendant to be a prevailing party from the requirements for a
plaintiff party as in KB Homes. 143 The language of the contractl 44 was
132. Id. at 864, 865-68.
133. Id. at 870.
134. Id. at 873 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 875 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
136. Fitzgerald v. Schroeder Ventures II, LLC, 345 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2011, no pet.).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Intercontinental Group P'ship v. KB Home Loan Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650
(Tex. 2009).
141. Id. at 652.
142. Fitzgerald, 345 S.W.3d at 627-29.
143. Id.
144. The subject contract was a standard contract form promulgated by the Texas Association of Realtors, with Section 16 providing: "If Buyer, Seller, any broker, or escrow
agent is a prevailing party in any legal proceeding brought under or with relation to this
contract or this transaction, such party is entitled to recover from the non-prevailing par-
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held to be determinative, and the court of appeals looked to the dictionary definition of "prevailing party" as indicative of the plain, ordinary,
and generally accepted meaning of such term. In particular, Black's Law
Dictionary defines a prevailing party "as '[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded ... [allso
termed successful party."14 5 Therefore, in the subject case, the seller and
broker had judgment rendered in their favor and were entitled to recover
costs and attorney's fees from the non-prevailing party. 146
Lesieurl4 7 further addresses the issue of attorney's fees for a prevailing
party in regards to a real estate broker's claim that it was a prevailing
party and entitled to recover attorney's fees. The applicable attorney's
fees provision read: "The prevailing party in any legal proceeding relating
to this contract is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees." In addressing the right of the broker, the San Antonio Court of Appeals noted
that the broker must be either a party to the contract or a third-party
beneficiary to raise such issue. 148 First, the court of appeals looked at the
contract and found only one provision describing the parties (the preamble), which did not include the broker. The broker signed the contract but
only for the purpose of agreeing to provisions regarding the broker's fee
and payment of the cooperating broker's fee. 1 4 9 Accordingly, the court of
appeals held that the broker was neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary to the contract and could not rely on or enforce the attorney's fee
provision. 50
B.

IMPRAcTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE

Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. v. Kingwood Crossroads, L.P.,151 involves a determination of impracticability of performance under a sales
contract, but the case really demonstrates the problems caused by sloppy
closing practices and loose talk not documented as amendments to a sales
contract. 152 In this case, Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP (Chevron) contracted to sell to Kingwood Crosssroads, L.P. (Kingwood), approximately seventy acres of land for $3,258,000. During its due diligence
period, Kingwood objected to a declaration of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions (CCRs) placed upon the property by the original developer,
ties all costs of such proceeding and reasonable attorney's fees." Id. at 626 (emphasis in
original).
145. Id. at 630 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004)) (emphasis in
original).
146. Id.
147. Lesieur v. Fryar, 325 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) (discussed in more detail at n.176).
148. Id. at 251.
149. Id. at 252.
150. Id. at 253.
151. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. v. Kingwood Crossroads, L.P., 346 S.W.3d 37, 50-61
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
152. The purchase price of the property and the subject contract was $3.258 million, but
legal fees incurred in connection with this suit exceeded $5 million. Id. at 43, 48-49.
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Exxon Land Development, Inc. (Exxon). 153 Chevron assured Kingwood
that it would resolve the issue, and the parties formally extended the due
diligence period of the contract; however, no formal amendments were
made as to the removal of the CCRs. After nearly two years of effort by
Chevron to have the CCRs removed or modified by Exxon to the satisfaction of Kingwood, Chevron gave up. The factual context is significantly more complicated due to the existence of an annexation document
that failed to include a legal description of the subject property and the
existence of a contract between Chevron's predecessor and Exxon that
required the annexation of the subject property under the CCRs. Although the title company was willing to remove the annexation exception
based on the invalid annexation document, Chevron, on the eve of closing, wrote to the title company describing the existence of the previously
undisclosed contract requiring annexation to the CCRs. 154 Based on this
new information, the title company refused to issue a title policy without
exception to the CCRs and suit followed.
Although many issues were raised and discussed, the issue of impracticability of performance was the main attraction. Chevron alleged impracticability as a defense to Kingwood's specific performance claim, and the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals analyzed the underlying
facts as to whether performance was impracticable. Kingwood argued
that the impracticability defense was invalid because (1) Chevron assumed the risk that performance might become impracticable, (2) the
performance became impracticable because of Chevron's own fault, and
(3) Chevron failed to use reasonable efforts to overcome the performance obstacle.' 5 5 In addressing the assumption of the risk argument, the
court of appeals looked to the initial contract provisions concerning the
objection and cure to title exceptions.156 It is important to note that the
court of appeals analyzed the original contract provisions because there
were no subsequent amendments to the contract that could have addressed what the parties would do with respect to the CCRs. 157 The court
of appeals concluded that Chevron did not fail to comply with the contract because a situation arose that prevented Chevron's compliance (the
title company's reinsertion of the annexation title exception), which was
contrary to the title resolution scheme set forth in the contract.s5 8 As to
Kingwood's allegation that the letter sent on the eve of closing by Chevron to the title company created an impracticability of performance, the
court of appeals looked to the truthfulness of the matters in the letter and
whether Chevron had a duty to make such disclosure. 15 9 Based on facts
presented at trial, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53-56.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58-60.
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sufficient to determine that the letter was truthful and Chevron had a
valid reason (other than avoiding performance under the contract) to
send the letter to the title company. 160 Therefore, Chevron's letter was
not the cause of impracticability of performance. 161 As to the "reasonable
efforts" of Chevron, the court of appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence as to Chevron's efforts to comply with the reasonable efforts requirement, suggesting that litigation with Exxon and
indemnification of the title company were not necessary actions due to
expense and uncertainty of result.162 Also, the court of appeals concluded
that any attempted monetary settlement was unnecessary because evidence suggested that Exxon would want the property annexed not only
for fees and assessments, but also to assure uniform development of all
properties under the CCRs.163
As suggested above, this case is more significant from a practical standpoint than a legal analysis. First, Exxon, as the developer, failed to record
a legally enforceable annexation document because no legal description
was attached. Secondly, Kingwood and Chevron took actions based on
various verbal statements.164 The impracticability issue could have been
readily resolved by an express amendment to the contract specifying the
actions to be assumed by Chevron. Such an amendment would have
clearly met the "assumption of risk" principle established by the court of
appeals. These actions run counter to the best practices of most real estate attorneys and resulted in a reasonably foreseeable result.

C. "As

Is" AND DISCLAIMER OF RELIANCE CLAUSES

In Williams v. Dardenne, the Houston First District Court of Appeals
addressed whether fraud in the inducement prevailed over an "as is"
clause. 165 Roger and Michelle Williams (Williams) sold a house to Richard and Marilyn Dardenne (Dardenne) pursuant to a standard Texas
Real Estate Commission (TREC) residential sales contract that contained an "as is" clause.16 6 The court of appeals noted that the "Acceptance of Property Condition" provision in the standard TREC contract
had been held by numerous Texas courts to be a valid "as is" provision.167
The sales contract listed two prior inspection reports, both of which addressed the home's foundation, but did not include a third inspection re160. Id.
161. Id. at 60-61.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60.
164. In fact, Kingwood expended over $350,000 in due diligence, development, and
marketing plans for the property prior to closing and resolution of the restrictions contained in the CCRs. Id. at 47.
165. Williams v. Dardenne, 345 S.W.3d 118, 119 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,
pet. denied).
166. Id. at 120.
167. Id. at 123.
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port. 168 After the purchase, Dardenne experienced significant foundation
problems, engaged a foundation engineer, and discovered it was the same
firm that had issued the third inspection report not disclosed in the sales
contract. Consequently, Dardenne brought suit for fraudulent inducement. Williams, the seller, claimed that the valid "as is" clause negated
the elements of causation and reliance for fraud claims; 169 however,
Dardeene argued that the "as is" provision was unenforceable because it
was procured by fraudulent inducement.o7 0 At issue was whether
Dardenne presented any evidence of reliance to support the claim for
fraudulent inducement. Dardenne testified that she would not have
bought the house if she knew at the time of closing what she knew at the
time of trial. However, the court of appeals found that this testimony was
no evidence that Dardenne would not have purchased the property if the
undisclosed foundation report had been listed in the contract.171 In support of this position, the court of appeals noted first that there was extensive evidence that the house had suffered significant foundation related
damages.172 Secondly, the undisclosed report contained no additional information not disclosed to Dardenne in the disclosed reports. 173 Finally,
there was no evidence that Dardenne even would have read the undisclosed report, since there was evidence in the record that while one listed
report was read, the other listed report was not read by Dardenne.174
Based on the lack of evidence as to actual fraudulent inducement, the
court of appeals concluded that the "as is" clause precluded the establishment of the elements of causation and reliance with respect to the various
fraud claims.17 5
Lesieur v. Fryar is another case involving an "as is" clause.176 Prior to
acquiring a house, Timothy and Sandra Fryar (Fryar) obtained an inspection report (the Adams Report) that indicated that the house had foundation problems. Three years later, Fryar sold the house to George Lesieur
(Lesieur) who also obtained an inspection report (the NPI Report). After
closing, Lesieur discovered significant foundation problems and that
Fryar did not disclose the Adams Report in the purchase and sale contract. Lesieur sued Fryar and the real estate agents. On appeal, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals analyzed whether the causation and reliance
elements of Lesieur's fraudulent concealment claim were negated by the
NPI Report. Upon analysis of both reports, the court of appeals concluded that although language differences existed in the reports, the un168. The third inspection report was not engaged by Williams but rather Williams's
former real estate agent, John Sellner, who was not working under Williams's authority. Id.
at 121.
169. Id. at 124.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 127.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 128-29.
176. Lesieur v. Fryar, 325 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, pet. denied).
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derlying foundation issues were sufficiently and equivalently described
such that the Adams Report would not have disclosed anything Lesieur
did not know from the NPI Report.' 77 Consequently, the court of appeals
held that the NPI Report presented the same substantive information as
the non-disclosed Adams Report and therefore negated the elements of
causation and reliance as a matter of law.' 7 8 Further, the court of appeals
addressed the Dallas Court of Appeals's more stringent requirements to
negate causation and reliance, as contained in Dubow v. Dragon.179 In
that case, the Dallas Court of Appeals required the following evidence to
negate causation and reliance as a matter of law: "(1) the buyer relied
solely on a pre-purchase inspection, which revealed the defect ... [,]" and
(2) there is a renegotiation of the sales contract based on the defect
. . . .180 The San Antonio Court of Appeals announced its disagreement
with the Dallas Court of Appeals's standard for negating causation and
reliance.181 This should be a red flag warning for practitioners.
In Matlock Place Apartments, L.P. v. Druce, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals addressed the enforceability of a disclaimer of reliance clause.182
The facts indicated that the seller delivered significantly false information
to the purchaser, including information with respect to occupancy rate,
maintenance, and criminal activities. However, the contract contained a
detailed and specific disclaimer of reliance clause.18 3 The court of appeals
reviewed previous Texas Supreme Court decisions on the enforceability
of disclaimer reliance clauses, focusing on Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen.184
Forest Oil Corp. listed five factors to be considered in determining the
enforceability of such a clause: (1) that the contract was negotiated and
not mere boilerplate, including negotiations regarding the issue which is
in dispute; (2) representation by counsel of the reliance party; "(3) the
parties dealt with each other in an arm's length transaction; (4) the parties were knowledgeable in business matters; and (5) the release language
was clear."' 85 Here, the court of appeals held that the detailed disclaimer
of reliance language in the subject contract clearly and unequivocably disclaimed the purchaser's reliance on the false information provided.186
The complete disclaimer of reliance provision is attached as Appendix A,
and the authors recommend that practitioners consider the use of the
provision in appropriate circumstances. In addition, the practitioner
177. Id. at 249.
178. Id. at 246, 249.
179. Id. at 249-50 (citing Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
no writ)).
180. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 250.
182. Matlock Place Apartments, L.P. v. Druce, 369 S.W.3d 355, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2012, pet. denied).
183. Id. at 370-71.
184. Id. at 369 (citing Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008)).
185. Id. (citing Forest Oil Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 60).
186. Id. at 372.
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should also consider the opinion in Italian Cowboy Partners,discussed in
Section VI.A. below.
VI.

LEASES AND LANDLORD/TENANT

There were a significant number of cases reported dealing with landlord/tenant issues. Four of them were identified as addressing novel questions. In particular, Italian Cowboy Partners,Ltd. v. PrudentialInsurance
Company of America 87 is a significant case in the continuing development of "as is" and waiver clauses. The other three cases noted below
address some interesting drafting and enforcement issues.
A.

PROPOSED LEASE LANGUAGE To

AVOID

A FRAUDULENT

INDUCEMENT CLAIM

The Italian Cowboy dispute arose when the owners/operators of the
Dallas restaurant "Italian Cowboy" terminated the restaurant's lease due
to the presence of a strong and persistent sewer gas odor in the building.
As is discussed in more detail below, the Texas Supreme Court held that
the standard merger clause, without more, was insufficient to constitute a
valid disclaimer of reliance on fraudulent misrepresentations or
omissions.'8 8
Restaurant owners and operators Jane and Francesco Secchi (the
Secchis) identified a vacant restaurant building in Keystone Park, a Dallas shopping center owned by Prudential Insurance Company of America
(Prudential) and managed by Prizm Partners (Prizm), as a possible location to open their new restaurant, Italian Cowboy. 189 The Secchis began
the process of negotiating a lease for the building with Prizm's property
management director, Fran Powell (Powell), and negotiations continued
for approximately five months. During this time at least seven different
drafts of the lease were circulated, and the Secchis visited the building on
several occasions. Also during this time, Powell made various statements
to the Secchis regarding the building and its condition, including statements such as "the building [is] practically new and ha[s] no problems[;]"
"the building [is] in perfect condition, never a problem whatsoever[;]"
and "there ha[s] been nothing wrong with the place at all." 1 9 0
The executed lease contained the following relevant provisions:
14.18 Representations. Tenant acknowledges that neither Landlord nor Landlord's agents, employees or contractors have made any
representations or promises with respect to the Site, the Shopping
Center or this Lease except as expressly set forth herein.
14.21 Entire Agreement. This lease constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter
187.
2011).
188.
189.
190.

Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 328.
Id.
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hereof, and no subsequent amendment or agreement shall be binding upon either party unless it is signed by each party .... 191
It was not until the Secchis began remodeling the building that they
first heard about the severe odor that had plagued the previous restaurant tenant, Hudson's Grill. Upon receiving such information, Francesco
Secchi contacted Powell and specifically asked her whether Hudson's
Grill had experienced an odor problem. "According to [Francesco]
Secchi, Powell answered that she had been working with the building 'all
the time,' and that '[n]ever before' had there been a problem-this was
the 'first time' she heard something was wrong."1 92 A week before the
restaurant's scheduled "soft opening," a clean-up crew removed a layer of
hardened grease that had been blocking the inlet pipe to the grease trap
and a constant foul sewer gas odor became evident immediately. Francesco Secchi contacted Powell, who acknowledged that she smelled the
odor but never admitted that the same problem had occurred with Hudson's Grill. Extensive attempts to remedy the persistent odor began immediately and continued for months. Unfortunately, none were
successful, and the foul odor persisted. Once open, the smell prevented
the restaurant from drawing customers. One customer even complained
to the health department, causing the City of Dallas to shut down the
restaurant for a period of time. Francesco complained to Powell again,
telling her that a restaurant could not operate with an odor like that.
Later on, Francesco Secchi contacted Powell to tell her that the odor was
so terrible that the restaurant could not carry on.
During all of this, Powell continued to deny knowledge of previous
odor problems. However, the Secchis soon learned from a former manager of Hudson's Grill not only that the odor was present during Hudson's tenancy and that attempts to remedy it at that time were also
unsuccessful, but also that Powell was aware of the odor at that time and
had visited Hudson's Grill a number of times while the odor was present.
Upon receiving this information, the Secchis immediately ceased paying
rent and closed the restaurant. The Secchis, on behalf of the restaurant,
then sued Prudential and Prizm, asserting the following claims: (1) fraud
in the inducement of the lease, (2) fraud based on later misrepresentations, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach of the implied warranty
of suitability, and (5) constructive eviction.193 They also sought rescission
of the lease.
At trial, the former regional manager of Hudson's Grill directly contradicted Powell's continued denials by testifying that "Powell 'knew of the
as
smell,' that 'she talked to [him] about it and other people about it 194
'ungodly.'
and
unbearable'
'almost
as
it
described
she
that
well,' and
Powell, however, persisted in her denial of having any knowledge of, or
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id.
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experience with, the odor during the Hudson's Grill tenancy. The trial
court found for the restaurant on all claims, and the restaurant elected to
rescind the lease and recover damages for the rescission. 195 The court of
appeals, however, reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment for the
restaurant, and entered judgment in favor of the landlord on its counterclaim for breach of contract.196 The Texas Supreme Court granted the
restaurant's petition for review.
The principal issue addressed by the supreme court was whether the
disclaimer-of-representations language in the Italian Cowboy lease simply acted as a standard merger clause, or whether it also disclaimed reliance on representations, thus negating a necessary element in the tenant's
establishment of a claim for fraudulent inducement.1 97 Upon analysis of
the issue, the supreme court ultimately held that the language (i.e., the
specific provisions quoted above) did not suffice to disclaim reliance or
bar a claim based on fraudulent inducement. 198 The supreme court's decision was based on the following two conclusions: (1) a plain reading of
the actual lease language indicated that the parties merely intended to
include the substance of a standard merger clause, which (as discussed
below) does not disclaim reliance; and (2) even if the parties had intended to disclaim reliance, the actual language contained in the lease did
not do so clearly and unequivocally. 199
The supreme court began by setting forth the well-established rules
that a merger clause does not waive the right to sue for fraud should a
party later discover that the representations it relied upon before signing
the contract were fraudulent "'and that the parol evidence rule does not
stand in the way of proof of such fraud." 200 In Dallas Farm Machinery v.
Reaves, the supreme court quoted the public policy argument made by
the Bates court in support of its decision regarding merger clauses:
The same public policy that in general sanctions the avoidance of a
promise obtained by deceit strikes down all attempts to circumvent
that policy by means of contractual devices. In the realm of fact it is
entirely possible for a party knowingly to agree that no representations have been made to him, while at the same time believing and
relying upon representations which in fact have been made and in
fact are false but for which he would not have made the agreement.
To deny this possibility is to ignore the frequent instances in everyday experience where parties accept, often without critical examination, and act upon agreements containing somewhere within their
four corners exculpatory clauses in one form or another, but where
they do so, nevertheless, in reliance upon the honesty of supposed
friends, the plausible and disarming statements of salesmen, or the
195. Id. at 330-31.
196. Id. at 331.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 331-32 (quoting Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reaves, 307 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex.
1957) (citing Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Mass. 1941)).
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customary course of business. To refuse relief would result in opening the door to a multitude of frauds and in thwarting the general
policy of the law. 2 0 1
The supreme court then discussed the exception to the rule that it developed in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson20 2 and applied in
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen. 203 In Schlumberger, the Texas Supreme
Court held that when sophisticated parties who are represented by counsel disclaim reliance on representations about a specific matter, such a
disclaimer may be binding and may conclusively negate the element of
reliance in a suit for fraudulent inducement. 204 The supreme court reasoned that although there is a clear desire to protect parties from unintentionally waiving a claim for fraud, there is also a desire to provide the
parties with the ability to fully and finally resolve disputes between them
by bargaining for and executing a release barring all further disputes. 205
The supreme court went on to clarify, however, that in order for a disclaimer of reliance on representations to effectively negate a claim for
fraudulent inducement, the parties' intent must be "clear and specific." 206
In Schlumberger, the parties had been involved in a long-lasting dispute
that they were attempting to put to bed once and for all. Given the circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement's formation, the supreme court determined that the disclaimer-of-reliance clause contained
therein had "the requisite clear and unequivocal expression of intent necessary to disclaim reliance on . . . specific representations by Schlum-

berger," and thus, the clause effectively precluded a claim for fraudulent
inducement. 207 The language evaluated by the supreme court in Schlumberger is set forth below:
[E]ach of us .. . expressly warrants and represents ... that no promise or agreement which is not herein expressed has been made to him
or her in executing this release, and that none of us is relying upon
any statement or representation of any agent of the parties being
released hereby. Each of us is relying on his or her own judgment
208

In Forest Oil, the Texas Supreme Court applied its Schlumberger holding to a settlement agreement that was intended to resolve both future
and past claims, and it held that "a freely negotiated agreement to settle
present disputes and arbitrate future ones" was enforceable. 209 The language evaluated by the supreme court in Forest Oil is set forth below:
201. Dallas Farm Mach. Co., 307 S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Bates, 31 N.E.2d at 558).
202. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
203. Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008).
204. Italian Cowboy Partners,Ltd., 341 S.W.3d at 332 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp.,
959 S.W.2d at 179).
205. Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 959 S.W.2d at 179).
206. Id. (quoting Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 959 S.W.2d at 179).
207. Schlumberger Tech Corp., 959 S.W.2d at 179-80.
208. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
209. Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 58, 62 (Tex. 2008).
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[We] expressly represent and warrant ... that no promise or agreement which is not herein expressed has been made to them in executing the releases contained in this Agreement, and that they are
not relying upon any statement or representation of any of the parties being released hereby. [We] ... are relying upon [our] own judgment ....

210

Although the supreme court acknowledged that "[a]n all-embracing
disclaimer of any and all representations, as [contained in the Forest Oil
agreement], shows the parties' clear intent" to disclaim reliance, it was
careful to clarify that "[its] holding should not be construed to mean that
a mere disclaimer standing alone will forgive intentional lies regardless of
context" and that it was declining "to adopt a per se rule that a disclaimer
automatically precludes a fraudulent-inducement claim." 211 Rather, the
supreme court was simply holding that in this specific factual context, the
Forest Oil disclaimer of reliance precluded a claim for fraudulent inducement by refuting the required element of reliance. 212 Accordingly, in addition to analyzing the Forest Oil disclaimer language under the
Schlumberger clear, specific, and unequivocal test, the supreme court announced the following four-part test for determining the validity of a disclaimer of reliance provision:
(1) Were the terms of the contract negotiated, rather then boilerplate;
(2) Was the complaining party represented by counsel;
(3) Did the parties deal with each other at arm's length; and
(4) Were the parties knowledgeable in business matters? 2 13
In the Italian Cowboy case, the landlord and tenant were in disagreement over whether a disclaimer of reliance existed, or whether the lease
provisions simply amounted to a standard merger clause, which (as stated
above) does not suffice to disclaim reliance. The supreme court stated
that the question of whether an adequate disclaimer of reliance exists is a
matter of law. 2 14 Prudential argued that the restaurant's fraud claim was
barred by its agreement (as set forth in § 14.18 of the lease) that Prudential did not make any representations outside the agreement. In other
words, Prudential attempted to convince the supreme court that the restaurant impliedly agreed not to rely on any external representations when
it agreed that no external representations were made. However, the supreme court after applying the typical rules of contract construction regarding interpretation, held that the language set forth in the Italian
Cowboy lease can only reasonably be interpreted to demonstrate that the
parties intended to include nothing more than a standard merger clause
in the lease (i.e., they intended to ensure that the contract invalidated or
superseded any previous agreements and negated the apparent authority
210. Id. at 54 n.4.
211. Id. at 58, 61.
212. Id. at 61.
213. Id. at 60.
214. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333
(Tex. 2011).
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of an agent to later modify the contract's terms). 215 Accordingly, they did
not intend to include a disclaimer of reliance on representations made by
Prudential, Prizm, or any of their respective agents. 216 Therefore, the supreme court determined that it was not necessary to consider any extraneous evidence to determine the parties' intent or the true meaning of
the document. 217
The supreme court distinguished the language in the Italian Cowboy
lease from the language analyzed in the Schlumberger and Forest Oil
cases by focusing on the presence (or lack thereof) of evidence of the
intent to disclaim reliance on other's representations and to rely on one's
own judgment.2 18 While it had decided that evidence of such intent was
present in both Schlumberger and Forest Oil, it held that no such intent
was evident in the Italian Cowboy lease. 219 In fact, it drew attention to
the fact that the term "rely" does not appear in any form in the Italian
Cowboy language. 220 The supreme court stated that "[t]here is a significant difference between a party disclaiming its reliance on certain representations, and therefore potentially relinquishing the right to pursue any
claim for which reliance is an element, and disclaiming the fact that no
other representations were made." 221 The Schlumberger, Forest Oil and
Italian Cowboy provisions are compared below:
Schlumberger:
[E]ach of us . . . expressly warrants and represents . . . that no

promise or agreement which is not herein expressed has been made
to him or her in executing this release, and that none of us is relying
upon any statement or representation of any agent of the parties being released hereby. Each of us is relying on his or her own judgment
222

Forest Oil:
[We] expressly represent and warrant .. . that no promise or agreement which is not herein expressed has been made to them in executing the releases contained in this Agreement, and that they are
not relying upon any statement or representation of any of the parties being released hereby. [We] are relying upon [our] own judgment . . . .223
Italian Cowboy: "Tenant acknowledges that neither Landlord nor
Landlord's agents, employees or contractors have made any representations or promises with respect to the Site, the Shopping Center or this
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 335 (emphasis in original).
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997).
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. 2008).
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Lease except as expressly set forth herein." 22 4
In a footnote, the supreme court stated that if the Italian Cowboy lease
had contained a clear and unequivocal disclaimer-of-reliance clause, the
analysis would have then proceeded to the circumstances surrounding the
lease's negotiation, drafting, and execution (i.e., pursuant to the four-part
test established in Forest Oil) in order to determine whether such a clause
would be binding on the parties. 225
A number of cases have addressed Schlumberger, Forest Oil, and Italian Cowboy.
In Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., a stock redemption case,
the Houston First District Court of Appeals applied Schlumberger,Forest
Oil, and Italian Cowboy to language contained in a redemption agreement and held that a sophisticated party represented by counsel had not
effectively disclaimed reliance on pre-closing representations. 226 The contractual provisions reviewed by that court of appeals are summarized as
follows:
"Independent Investigation" Clause-The clause provides that (1) Allen based his decision to sell on his independent due diligence, expertise,
and the advice of his own engineering and economic consultants; (2) the
Phalon appraisal and the Haas reserve analysis were estimates and other
professionals might provide different estimates; (3) events subsequent to
the reports might have a positive or negative impact on the value of
Chief; (4) Allen was given the opportunity to discuss the reports and obtain any additional information from Chief's employees as well as Phalon
and Haas; and (5) the redemption price was based on the Phalon and
Haas reports regardless of whether those reports reflected the actual
value and regardless of any subsequent change in value since the
reports. 227
The "Independent Investigation" clause also included mutual releases
"from any claims that might arise as a result of any determination that the
value of [Chief] . . . was more or less than" the agreed redemption price

at the time of closing. 228
In its opinion, the Allen court focused on and drew attention to the
following items relating to the drafting of the subject disclaimer-of-reliance provisions:
The court of appeals noted the critical importance of the absence of the
words "only," "exclusively," or "solely" in describing Allen's reliance on
his own judgment and independent investigation. 229
The court of appeals noted that the words "disclaimer of reliance" are
not necessary to preclude a fraudulent inducement claim. Yet, the court
224. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd., 341 S.W.3d at 348.
225. Id. at 337 n.8.
226. Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
227. Id. at 377 n.18.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
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of appeals stated that it would be necessary to include: (1) a clear and
unequivocal disclaimer of reliance (however, it did not expand on what
would be considered clear and unequivocal); (2) an express waiver specific to fraudulent inducement claims; and (3) an all-embracing disclaimer
of any and all representations and any duty to make any disclosures. 230
The court of appeals found that the Allen language did not do any of
the following but indicated that if it had there might have been a different
result. 23 1 The Allen language did not: (1) state that the only representations that had been made were those set forth in the agreement; (2) contain a broad disclaimer that any extra-contractual representation had
been made and that no duty existed to make any disclosures; (3) provide
that Allen had not relied on any representations or omissions by Chief;
nor (4) include a specific "no liability" clause stating that the party providing certain information will not be liable for any other person's use of
the information. 232
Though admittedly unnecessary, the Allen court also addressed (in
dicta) the four-part test announced in Forest Oil. After noting that it was
unsettled among the courts how many of the Forest Oil factors must be
satisfied for a disclaimer of reliance to be effective, the Allen court concluded that two factors are absolutely necessary-the complaining party
must be a sophisticated party and represented by counsel in the negotiation. 2 3 3 Then, according to the Allen court, the sophisticated party represented by counsel must also show "that the party who agree[d] to the
disclaimer either (1) did in fact negotiate the contract terms or (2) had
the ability to negotiate terms because the parties dealt with each other at
arm's length." 234 Some proposed language to address these issues is attached as Appendix B.

B.

DRAFTING A LEASE TERM

During the Survey period, the courts reaffirmed "tenancy at will" as a
default position in construing the term of a lease. In Providence Land
Services, LLC v. Jones, the issue involved lakefront property and leases
for the property between the purchased lots and the water. 235 When the
leases were completed to specify a ninety-nine year term, those leases
were enforced accordingly. However, in many of the leases the concluding term of the lease was identified as "indefinite" or "no-end term." The
Eastland Court of Appeals stated that an indefinite and uncertain length
of time is an "estate at will," and "indefinite" was not found to constitute
the same as "perpetual," "forever," or "infinity," but rather was uncer230. Id. at 380.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 384-86.
234. Id. at 385.
235. Providence Land Servs., LLC v. Jones, 353 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2011, no pet.).
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tain.2 3 6 Accordingly, the leases were tenancies at will. 2 3 7
Likewise, in Effel v. Rosberg, a lease "for a term equal to the remainder of the Lessee's life, or until such time that she voluntarily vacates the
premises" did not satisfy the certainty requirement. 238 The lease was considered a tenancy at will. 2 3 9 The uncertainty of the date of the lessee's
death rendered the lease terminable at will by either party.240
C.

EvicrioN

In Moncada v. Navar, the El Paso Court of Appeals interpreted Rule
749b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedures and also recently passed legislation, Texas Property Code §§ 24.0053 and 24.0054, relating to payment
of rent pending appeal in nonpayment of rent cases. 241 Moncada is a forcible detainer suit, resulting from a foreclosure purchaser's attempt to
evict the current occupants. The Moncadas were the current occupants of
the foreclosed home and refused to vacate the premises after Bert Navar
purchased the home at a foreclosure sale, even though there was no
rental agreement. Thus, Rule 749b and Texas Property Code §§ 24.0053
and 24.0054 were not applicable to an appeal by the Moncadas. 242 The
Moncadas also filed a pauper's affidavit, which was uncontested. "Rule
749b simply provides a procedure by which an indigent appellant may
remain on the premises during the appeal: an appellant who appeals by
filing a pauper's affidavit 'shall be entitled to stay in possession of the
premises during the pendency of the appeal' by complying with the procedures set forth in the rule." 243 Thus, Rule 749c dealt with perfecting an
appeal while Rule 749b dealt with continued possession.
VII.

CONSTRUCTION MATTERS

Two cases were noteworthy in the area of construction law. The first,
Gray v. Entis MechanicalServices LLC, highlights the current difficulty in
applying the fraudulent-lien statute. 2 44 This statute was originally passed
to deal with the problem of lien filings intentionally intended to cloud
title. It has been extended to apply to any lien that might satisfy the elements of the statute, somewhat loosely written. In particular, it has found
its way into the area of affidavits claiming a mechanic's lien. In the Gray
case, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals set out the elements of the fraudulent-lien statute: (1) knowledge; (2) intent that the
236. Id. at 542.
237. Id.
238. Effel v. Rosberg, 360 S.W.3d 626, 628, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
239. Id. at 630-31.
240. Id. at 631.
241. Moncada v. Navar, 334 S.W.3d 339, 341-42 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, no pet.);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 749b; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.0053-.0054 (West 2012).
242. Moncada, 334 S.W.3d at 341-42.
243. Id. at 342 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 749b).
244. Gray v. Entis Mech. Servs., L.L.C., 343 S.W.3d 527, 529-31 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.002 (West Supp.
2009).
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document be given legal effect; and (3) intent to cause financial injury. 245
The lower court was reversed with directions that the intent to cause financial injury was an issue of fact that could not be decided on summary
judgment. 246 The reported details indicated that a payment was made,
marked paid in full, and the subcontractor refused to release the lien associated with a disputed amount. A concurring opinion turned on an inadequacy-a double negative-in an affidavit used to support the motion
for summary judgment. 247 The Texas Legislature reviewed legislation in
connection with modifications to the fraudulent-lien statute to help address the difficulty of an unintended breath of scope in applying this statute, but did not pass any bills. 2 4 8
Similarly pointing out the complexity of Texas Property Code Chapter
53, the Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Loeb 24 9 case out of the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals highlights the difficulty some subcontractors incur in complying with the fund trapping provisions and the
calculation of the time requirements for filing an affidavit claiming a lien.
In particular, in this case, the court of appeals found that each month's
delivery was supported by a separate invoice, which began accrual of the
time to file or to submit notices of the lien claims. 25 0 In addition, the
property was a homestead and the subcontractor failed to give the complete notice, omitting the required last sentence of the notice that goes to
the homeowners. The subcontractor was understandably disturbed because the owner proceeded to pay the general contractor despite evidence of actual notice of the fund trapping and affidavit claiming a lien.
Once again, whether one agrees or not with the statutory regime set out
in Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code, this case demonstrates the
difficulty in meeting strict compliance with the statute.
VIII. TITLE MATTERS
A.

PARTITION

In the world of conveyances and title issues, four cases were noted as
dealing with some important, though often obscure, provisions. In the
first case, Barham v. McGraw, the Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed
an alleged partition agreement and a family conflict over what "mother"
must have intended. 251 Chief Justice Quinn begins his opinion with a
pithy reference to the evils of greed and the complications of family. 252
245. Gray, 343 S.W.3d at 529-30 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§

12.002).

246. Id. at 530-31.
247. Id. at 531-32 (Frost, J., concurring).
248. See H.B. 3474, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); H.B. 2567, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); S.B. 693,
83d Leg., R.S. (2013).
249. Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Loeb, 349 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

250. Id. at 667-68.
251. Barham v. McGraw, 342 S.W.3d 716, 717-18 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, pet.
denied).
252. Id. at 717 (stating "Blood may be thicker than water, but money beats everything"
and "He that is greedy of gain troubleth his own house").
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By letter agreement, the family members attempted to reach a partition
at one point, attaching to a letter agreement an aerial view of the property. The letter agreement was inadequate in many aspects, including an
adequate legal description. The aerial photo was not enough. Moreover,
the court of appeals noted that partition was a matter of dividing property owned by co-tenants and concerned possession, not title. 2 5 3 In this
case, possession continued to reside in the trustee, their mother. The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the partition agreement but
reversed on the issue regarding sanctions and time requirements under
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 9.012(c), which requires a
ninety day waiting period after a violation before imposition of a
sanction.2 54
In addressing yet another obscure provision in the partition context,
the El Paso Court of Appeals, in Gardnerv. Estate of Trader,addressed
Texas Property Code §§ 29.001-.004 and the forced sale of an owner's
interest in real property as reimbursement for property taxes paid by a
co-owner on that owner's behalf. 2 5 5 First, the court of appeals noted that
Chapter 29 only applies to real property that is not exempt from forced
sale under the Constitution, such as homestead property, and must be
property received by a person as a result of the death of another person
by inheritance, under a will, by a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, or by any other survivorship agreement passing title other than an
agreement between spouses for community property with a survivorship. 2 5 6 Of course, this is fairly limiting, but in such an event, the payor
may file a petition in district court for an order to require another owner
of an undivided interest in that property to sell the other owner's interest
in the property to the payor. 257 The payor must have paid the ad valorem
taxes for three years in a five year period, and the other owner must not
have been reimbursed "for more than half of the total amount paid by the
person for the taxes on the owner's behalf." 258 In this case, the defendant
undertook to reimburse the petitioner/payor but did so after the suit was
filed. The court of appeals found that to be sufficient, and it also held that
259
a forced sale could not be ordered under such circumstances.
B.

MUNIMENT OF TITLE

The Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed the use of a muniment of
title more than four years after the death of the testator in In re Estate of
Campbell.260 The standard for filing a muniment of title after four years
253. Id. at 719.
254. Id. at 719-20; TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.012(c) (West 2012).
255. Gardner v. Estate of Trader, 333 S.W.3d 331, 334, 336-37 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2010, no pet.); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 29.001-.004 (West 2012).
256. Gardner, 333 S.W.3d at 336.
257. Id.; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 29.002(a).
258. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 29.002(a)(2).
259. Gardner,333 S.W.3d at 337.
260. In re Estate of Campbell, 343 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, no pet).
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requires that the party applying for probate was not in default in failing to
present the same for probate within four years. 261 The court of appeals
noted that the focus of the default inquiry-that is, the absence of reasonable diligence-is to be on the part of the party offering the instrument. 2 6 2 Generally, a party applying for probate would not be considered
personally in default if he or she did not know of the existence of the will,
provided such proponent was not negligent in failing to discover whether
there was a will. 2 6 3 In summary, the default of another did not preclude a
non-defaulting applicant from filing the will.
C.

STRIPS AND GORES

In yet another unique case, Escondido Services, LLC v. VKM Holdings, LP, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed both the appurtenance doctrine and the strips and gore doctrine. 264 This was a trespass to
try title action involving mineral rights underneath a strip of land that had
been conveyed to the State for a highway. An earlier conveyance had
expressly reserved "oil, gas, and sulphur." 265 A subsequent conveyance
by the landowner described the property up to the boundary of the roadway and did not reserve minerals. The question, of course, was ownership
of the minerals under the highway strip. Relying on the appurtenance and
strip and gore doctrines, the court of appeals restated the general rule set
out by the Texas Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Bass as follows:
The established doctrine of the common law is, that a conveyance of
land bounded on a public highway carries with it the fee to the center
of the road .... Such is the legal construction of the grant unless the
inference that it was so intended is rebutted by the express terms of
the grant. The owners of the land on each side go to the center of the
road, and they have the exclusive right to the soil, subject to the right
of passage in the public. 2 6 6
In this case, the appellant asserted that the strip and gore doctrine did
not apply to a mineral interest lying underneath a separately conveyed
fee estate to the State. The court of appeals found that the conveyance to
the State as a result of a deed rather than an easement was of no practical
consequence. 267 The strip and gore doctrine was applicable to a mineral
interest underneath a highway reserved in a deed to the State. 268 It additionally was not relevant that the highway had not yet been
constructed. 269
261. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.

§ 73(a)

(West 2012).

262. In re Estate of Campbell, 343 S.W.3d at 902-04.
263. Id. at 903.

264. Escondido Servs., LLC v. VKM Holdings, LP, 321 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, no pet.).
265. Id. at 109.
266. Id. at 106 (quoting Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Tex. 372, 380 (1862)).
267. Id. at 107.
268. Id. at 106-07.
269. Id. at 108.
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EASEMENT BY ESTOPPEL

In Martin v. Cockrell,270 the Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed a
somewhat popular theory of easement by estoppel. More and more
courts have tended to find easements by estoppel under appropriate circumstances, including when someone detrimentally relies on another's
"representations." 27 1 In this case, the court of appeals found that silence
did not give rise to an easement by estoppel. 272 Moreover, the court of
appeals noted that where two methods of access exist, but a second roadway is a matter of convenience, that simple impassability does not create
an easement right against another's property. 273
E.

RESTRICTIONS

In an interesting case dealing with condominium regimes, which ostensibly would transfer the same logic to covenants, conditions, and restrictions, the Dallas Court of Appeals, in Riner v. Neumann, held that a
home equity security instrument was a deed of trust for purposes of determining priority of liens. 2 7 4 Thus, the condominium documents
subordinate to a deed of trust included a home equity loan. 2 7 5 Such language stated that "[a]ll liens securing sums due or to become due under
any prior recorded purchase money mortgage, vendor's lien or deed of
trust." 2 7 6 This decision, based on the context of the wording, is highly
questionable and was probably driven by the result. One should note that
this case involved a condominium declaration before adoption of the
Texas Uniform Condominium Act. The court of appeals also found that
the lien for unpaid assessments arose on the date of the failure of payment of the assessment. 27 7 In this case, this placed the home equity loan
ahead of the assessment lien in terms of time.
In another case, interesting for its facts but also because of the clash of
legal rights held by the developer, a fiduciary duty won out over good
intentions. In Lesley v. Veterans Land Board of the State of Texas, a subdivision developer held the executive mineral rights for land which he
also sought to develop for residential property. 278 As part of the development of the residential property, the subdivision developer filed restrictive covenants limiting future leasing of minerals. Problematic, however,
was the estimated $610 million worth of minerals underneath the surface
that apparently could not be reached from outside the subdivision. The
Texas Supreme Court found that this violated the fiduciary duty of the
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Martin v. Cockrell, 335 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.).
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238-40.
Riner v. Neumann, 353 S.W.3d 312, 320 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 317.
Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of State, 352 S.W.3d 479, 481 (Tex. 2011).
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executive right holder to the mineral interests held by others. 279 The
holder of the executive right had a duty to develop the minerals. 280 Also
interesting, the remedy the supreme court selected was to cancel the restrictive covenants. 281 The supreme court felt that the common law accommodation doctrine was adequate to protect the landowners. 282
F.

HOME EQuITy

Two other cases addressing home equity loans were reported during
the Survey period. Both were federal court cases, and in the first, Smith v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank,283 the district court addressed the issues of limitations and defects in the home equity loans. This district court followed a
previous opinion of Judge Barbara Lynn in which a four-year limitations
applied in connection with claims for damages, but not in connection with
the challenge to the lien.2 8 4 The theory is that a lien on a homestead that
does not comply with constitutional requirements is completely invalidthat is, void-and cannot be made valid later. 2 8 5 This case involved a second prohibited home equity loan. In its analysis, the district court also
indicated that the sixty day cure period was the constitutional provision
to balance the equities between the borrower and the lender.2 86 An application of the statute of limitations, which by its language does not include
actions to recover real property, would upset the checks and balances
provided by the Texas Constitution. 287
Texas intermediate appellate courts and the majority of federal courts
have applied the residual four-year statute of limitation, set forth in Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.051, to constitutional claims under
the home equity provisions, with an accrual date being the date the loan
is closed. 288 The Eastern District of Texas has recently produced two
cases holding that the residual four-year statute of limitation is applicable
to constitutional claims under the home equity provisions. 289
However, there is federal authority to the contrary in the Southern and
Northern Districts of Texas. In Smith v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the dis279. Id. at 491.
280. Id. at 491-92.
281. Id. at 491.
282. Id. at 492.
283. Smith v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'1 Ass'n, 825 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. Tex. 2011),
adhered to on reconsideration,CIV. A. C-11-260, 2012 WL 43627 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2012).
284. Santos v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-2592-M-BK, 2012 WL 1065464 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 29, 2012).
285. Smith, 825 F. Supp. at 861-62.
286. Id. at 863 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 506(a)(6)(Q)(x)).
287. Id. at 868.
288. See Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2008, no pet.); Kennedy v. Argent Mortg. Co., No. H-12-1137, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106663 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2012); Belanger v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 839 F.
Supp. 2d 873 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
289. See Blodgett v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 4:11-CV-00051, 2012 WL
32950 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012); Priester v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. 4:10-CV-641, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142031, adopt. mem., No. 4:10-cv-00641, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141415
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2011).
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trict court concluded that, despite the Texas and federal decisions holding
to the contrary, there is no time limit for cure of home equity loan violations, and there is no limitations period applicable to the claim based on
the violation.290 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit in Boutari v. JP Morgan
Chase, a per curiam decision, affirmed a district court's order adopting a
magistrate's recommendation that found claims for home equity loan violations time barred after four years. 291 JPMorgan Chase filed a motion
for reconsideration based on the Boutariper curiam decision. 292 The district court ignored Boutari and denied the motion to reconsider. 293 It
stated that it was unclear whether the court of appeals affirmed on the
basis of limitations. 2 94
Also, in Santos v. CitiMortgage, the magistrate judge recommended
that a motion to dismiss claims for home equity loan violations based on
limitations should be denied. 29 5 Judge Lynn adopted the recommendation
in part and rejected it in part.2 9 6 She followed the Smith case and held
that the lien claim was not subject to limitations. 297 However, she also
concluded that the claim for forfeiture of all principal and interest due
four years before the suit was brought was barred by the residual fouryear statute of limitation. 298
However, since these cases were reported, the Fifth Circuit, in Priester
v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., found four-year statute of limitations
uniformly applicable to home equity loan claims. 2 9 9 The Priestercase involved contentions that (1) the closing of the loan occurred in the borrower's home, rather than at the office of an attorney, lender, or title
company, and (2) they did not receive notice of their rights twelve days
before closing. Both of these items are required by the Texas Constitution.3 00 The Priesters sent their cure demand more than four years after
the closing. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, but two Texas courts of appeals have, both finding
that the residual four-year statute of limitation applies. 30 1 After some
analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded "that a limitations period applies to
constitutional infirmities under § 50(a)(6)." 302 The decision did not limit
itself to the two infirmities under discussion. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
290. Smith, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
291. Boutari v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 429 F. App'x 407 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
292. Smith v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat'1 Ass'n, No. C-11-260, 2012 WL 43627 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 9, 2012).
293. Id. at *1-2.
294. Id. at *2.
295. Santos v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-2592-M-BK, 2012 WL 1065464, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2012).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Priester v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2013).
300. Id. at 671.
301. Id. at 673.
302. Id. 674; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
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found that "[t]he injury occurred when the Priesters created the lien, and
there was nothing that made the injury undiscoverable." 30 3 Accordingly,
limitations began at the time of closing. "A lack of knowledge that that
was a violation of the law is insufficient to toll limitations." 3 0 Again, the
Texas Supreme Court has not written on this issue.
In another Fifth Circuit case, Cerda v. 2004-EQRI L. L. C.,30 the court
of appeals dealt with the issue of substantially equal payments. In particular, the court of appeals addressed the potential conflict between permissible variable interest rates and the constitutional requirement that
scheduled payments be substantially equal. 306 The court of appeals found
that balloon payments are prohibited, and in order to fully amortize a
loan over its remaining term, each time an interest rate was adjusted it
would permissibly result in substantially equal, but different, amortized
payments over the balance of the loan term. 307
IX. NUISANCE TRESPASS
A.

LIMITATIONS

The courts addressed nuisance in a number of cases. This continues to
be an active area in jurisprudence. In ACCI Forwarding,Inc. v. Gonzalez
Warehouse Partnership,ACCI Forwarding, Inc. (ACCI) placed oil field
chemicals in Gonzalez Warehouse Partnership's (GWP) warehouse and
failed to remove them. 308 After the short term agreement, GWP found
itself with a difficult disposal issue. This occurred in October of 2000, and
in 2003, GWP found a purchaser for its property, but a requirement of
the contract was that the chemicals be removed. In the fall of 2003, GWP
paid to have the chemicals properly removed. The suit was filed in February of 2005 and trial finally reached in May of 2009.309 The San Antonio
Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he determination of the accrual date for
damage to real property depends on the characterization of the injury as
permanent or temporary."31 0 A permanent trespass or nuisance claim accrues upon discovery of the injury, while a temporary trespass or nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury.3 11 Accordingly, "a cause of
action for permanent injury to land must be brought within two years,
[while] damages for temporary injury to land may be recovered for the
two years prior to filing suit." 3 12 In this case, because the tortious conduct
could have been terminated, the court of appeals found it to be a tempo303. Priester,708 F.3d at 676.
304. Id.
305. Cerda v. 2004-EQR1 L.L.C., 612 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2010).
306. Id. at 789.
307. Id. at 789-92.
308. ACCI Forwarding, Inc. v. Gonzalez Warehouse P'ship, 341 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 63.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 64.
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rary injury to land. 3 1 3 In addition, the damage could be cured and was not
permanent in nature. 314 "Because the injury here was temporary, GWP
could recover damages for the two years prior to filing suit," including the
cost of properly removing and disposing of the chemicals. 3 15 Also of interest in this case, ACCI's corporate privileges were forfeited under the
Texas Tax Code. 316 Accordingly, each officer or director of the corporation became liable for the debt of the corporation.3 1 7 The court of appeals
found that tort liability, not just contract liability, constituted debt of the
corporation.3 1 8 There were some stipulations and unique items in the jury
charge that may limit the holding of this case, but again, a careful note for
the practitioner, especially in that a corporate liability became a personal
liability.
In contrast, Yalamanchili v. Mousa held that limitations began for a
nuisance cause of action at the time when a homeowner first became
aware of damage to his plants and trees due to post-rain runoff water
from an adjacent shopping center. 319 In this case, the rain runoff, which
occurred "with every rain of any magnitude," was a permanent nuisance
and limitations began upon discovery of the first damage. 320 The plaintiff
also alleged damages to his foundation, which he discovered at a later
date, but the Houston Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff knew that
plants and trees were dying, and he knew he had moisture retention
problems. 32 1 However, the court of appeals did leave open a question as
to whether the limitations would apply to a request for permanent
injunction.
Also of importance is Sullivan v. Brokers Logistics, Ltd. where the El
Paso Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment based on limitations requiring a jury determination as to whether a 100 year flood in El
Paso, and the resulting silt build-up on down flood property, was a temporary or permanent injury. 322 Moreover, in Markwardt v. Texas Industries, Inc., the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals found that
the continuing-tort doctrine did not apply to a cause of action for permanent nuisance, so as to extend the statute of limitations. 323
A statute of repose was also applied to a nuisance claim in Ehler v.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 62 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.252 (West 2008)).

317. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§

171.252(2).

318. ACCI Forwarding,Inc., 341 S.W.3d at 67.
319. Yalamanchili v. Mousa, 316 S.W.3d 33, 38-39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, pet. denied).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 40-41.
322. Sullivan v. Brokers Logistics, Ltd., 357 S.W.3d 833, 834-38 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2012, pet. denied).
323. Markwardt v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 325 S.W.3d 876, 893-94 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
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LVDVD, L.C 3 2 4 The statute of repose was for a one year period and
statutorily created for lawful agricultural operations. 325 Thus, the landowners were precluded from bringing an action against a neighboring
dairy farm that was conducting lawful agricultural activities.326

B.

"ACTIONABLE" NUISANCE

The Austin Court of Appeals addressed the seminal question of what

constitutes an "actionable" nuisance as opposed to a "mere" nuisance. 327
In HansonAggregates West, Inc. v. Ford,a long utilized rock quarry and a

nearby community had expanded over time to become closer in distance
to one another. Allegedly, the quarry's operations, including occasional
blasting operations and dust, constituted a nuisance to homeowners in the
area. The trial court found for the homeowners, but on appeal, the court
of appeals noted that an actionable nuisance required some showing that
the conduct was wrongful, caused by intentional or negligent conduct, or
abnormal and out of place in its surroundings. 328 The court of appeals
rejected a theory of absolute liability for nuisance. 329
C.

TRESPASS

The Texas Supreme Court also addressed trespass in Barnes v. Mathis,
a case that dealt with road construction and a neighboring wetlands
area.330 In this case, the road across a creek, which was upstream from
the wetlands area, included culverts, or drainage pipes, but allegedly
caused flooding. There was significant disagreement as to whether the
new road caused a nuisance, or whether the flooding was caused by rain,
animal activity, and the like. Basically this case has a good discussion of
nuisance and trespass, but the supreme court reversed and remanded the
case for determination of a fact question as to whether there had been
33
either a nuisance or trespass. 1

D.

PERMITTING

In another trespass case, the Texas Supreme Court addressed permitting and, in particular, the Injection Well Act, located in Chapter 27 of
the Texas Water Code. 3 3 2 The supreme court reversed the trial court,
which essentially had found that a permitted deep subsurface injection
324. Ehler v. LVDVD, L.C., 319 S.W.3d 817, 820-22 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no
pet.).
325. Id. at 820-21; TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.003, 251.004(a) (West 2012).
326. Ehler, 319 S.W.3d at 821-22.
327. Hanson Aggregates W., Inc. v. Ford, 338 S.W.3d 39, 46-48 (Tex. App.-Austin
2011, pet. denied).
328. Id. at 46.
329. Id.
330. Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 762 (Tex. 2011).
331. Id. at 766.
332. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.001-.105 (West 2012).
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could not arise to a trespass when the fluids that were injected at deep
levels later migrated into the deep subsurface of nearby tracts.333 The
supreme court noted that a permit only removes a government imposed
barrier to a particular activity and does not relieve the party of tort liability.33 4 "[A] permit is a 'negative pronouncement' that 'grants no affirmative rights to the permitee." 335 This decision was made somewhat easier
because the Texas Administrative Code, which governs Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) permits, also states that "[tihe
issuance of a permit does not authorize any injury to persons or property
or an invasion of other property rights, or any infringement of state or
local law or regulations."3 36 Thus, operators utilizing deep injection wells
will need to conduct an analysis that extends beyond the permit process.
E.

STANDING/DAMAGES

The courts additionally addressed damages to land and improvements
on numerous occasions. While most of the cases will be in the context of
nuisance or trespass, the Texas Supreme Court dealt with the Natural Resources Code in Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C.33 In this
case, a current mineral lessee sought to bring an action against a prior
lessee for failure to properly plug a well. The supreme court found that
the Natural Resources Code created a private cause of action resulting
from statutory violations,338 but the current mineral lessee lacked standing to bring those claims. 339 The supreme court fell back on the common
law principle that a subsequent purchaser of real property does not have
the right to recover for an entry to the land committed before his
purchase, unless there is an express assignment of the cause of action. 340
The right to sue for the damage to the property belonged to the person
who owned the property at the time of the injury.341 Many times grantees
under a warranty deed assert a right to bring a claim for damages, but a
warranty deed will not support an assignment of that claim. In this case,
the supreme court noted that if the legislature had intended to change the
common law principle it could have done so in the statute, and it did
not. 342

333. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 314-15.
334. Id. at 310-11.
335. Id. at 310 (quoting Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 170 S.W.2d 189, 191
(Tex. 1943)).
336. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.122(d) (2013).
337. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 331 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010).
338. Id. at 422 (citing TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2012)).
339. Id. at 424-25.
340. Id. at 424.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 425.
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PREMISES LIABILITY

The Dallas Court of Appeals, in Jensen v. Southwest Rodeo, L.P., refused to extend responsibility for a defect in a leased premises to the
lessor where multiple tenants used the space in question.34 3 In this case,
the premises were an arena and events center located in Mesquite, Texas,
which were leased to various entities for events. The injured plaintiff fell
on arena stairs, alleged a defect, and brought a claim against the owner of
the arena. 344 The plaintiff attended an event for which the premises had
been leased. The court of appeals distinguished City of Irving v. Seppy
largely because of the nature of the lease agreement. 345 Accordingly, this
case presents a good drafting lesson for counsel to identify and specifically allocate control and responsibility for maintenance and safety.
In Hyde v. Hoerauf,the Texarkana Court of Appeals dealt with the
more recent phenomenon of "pasture parties." 346 A pasture party is an
event where party-goers lack permission to be on certain property but use
it nonetheless because the property is "out in the middle of nowhere." 347
In this case, one of the participants driving home from the pasture party
was tragically killed in an automobile accident. The trial court granted
summary judgment, dismissing the wrongful death action, and the matter
was brought on appeal. 348 On appeal, the plaintiffs raised for the first
time the issue that the trespassing motorist was a licensee, based on the
landowner's failure to prevent the multiple pasture parties. 349 This case
highlights the need for a landowner to be vigilant about repeated trespassing to avoid such a claim. In this particular case, the court of appeals
declined to hear the licensee allegation because it had not been raised in
the trial court.35 0 The court of appeals also suggested in its discussion that
the landowner may have owed some duty under premises liability to the
intoxicated participant had there been an accident on the property. 3 51
XI.

REALTORS AND BROKERS

There were a number of cases dealing with listing agreements, all of
which applied stringent requirements for the real estate agent. In the first
case, Clouse v. Levin, Mark Levin (Levin) was a real-estate agent and
independent contractor. 352 Levin had an agreement with the Clouses,
who were interested in purchasing a house, on behalf of Coldwell Banker,
the real-estate broker. He was not individually a party to the agreement.
343. Jensen v. Sw. Rodeo, L.P., 350 S.W.3d 755, 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 757-59 (citing City of Irving v. Seppy, 301 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2009, no pet.)).
346. Hyde v. Hoerauf, 337 S.W.3d 431, 433 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 435 n.9.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 436-37, 439 n.13.
352. Clouse v. Levin, 339 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no
pet.).
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After Levin left Coldwell Banker, Coldwell Banker assigned its rights to
commissions provided for in the agreement dated August 11, 2007, to
Levin.35 3 However, the original agreement was signed on November 11,
2007. Levin testified that this was a typographical error and that the intended date of the Buyer Representation Agreement was November 11,
2007.354 The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals found that
Levin was not a party to a written agreement with the Clouses and that
the assignment was ineffective.35 5 Similarly, in Neary v. Mikob Properties,
Inc., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a term sheet and other communications, including emails, did not constitute a written agreement to
pay a commission on the sale of apartment complexes. 356 These communications did not satisfy the requirements of § 1101.806(c) of the Real
Estate Licensing Act (RELA).3 5 7 In addition, the parties' communication
did have some of the standard language indicating that it was the parties'
mutual intent that the agreement was not binding upon them, which also
may have lent to this result.35 8 Finally, in Barton v. Sclafani Investments,
Inc., the Dallas Court of Appeals investigated the element of consideration, finding that prior services before an agreement did not constitute
sufficient consideration.3 5 9 Note that this case applies Tennessee law, but
it is likely that the same result would be reached under Texas law.
XII.

WATER AND TITLE

As a matter of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court held in Severance v. Patterson that an avulsive event that moves the high tide line and
vegetation line suddenly, causing former dry beach to become part of
State-owned wet beach, does not automatically deprive private property
owners, through the rolling easement doctrine and Texas Open Beaches
Act, of their right to exclude the public from the new dry beach. 360 In this
case, Hurricane Rita devastated a landowner's beach-front property that
was subject to a public easement and suddenly moved the vegetation line
substantially landward. The State claimed an easement on the new dry
beach. The supreme court held that easements for public use of private
dry beach property may change according to gradual and imperceptible
changes to the coastal landscape. 361 However, avulsive events, such as
storms and hurricanes, that drastically alter pre-existing littoral boundaries do not automatically have the effect of allowing a public use ease353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 770-71.
356. Neary v. Mikob Props., Inc., 340 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no
pet.).
357. Id. at 584; see TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1101.806(c) (West 2004).
358. See Neary, 340 S.W.3d at 584.
359. Barton v. Sclafani Invs., Inc., 320 S.W.3d 453, 454 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
denied).
360. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723-27 (Tex. 2012).
361. Id. at 723.
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ment to migrate onto previously unencumbered property. 362 In such a
case, if the public has an easement in newly created dry beach, as with
any other property, the State must prove it.363
Severance included a dissenting opinion, which lamented that the decision jeopardized the public's right to free and open beaches and would
lead to restricted access along the coast.36 The government was not "taking" private property but merely enforcing changing boundaries caused
by nature, and therefore no compensation was appropriate. 365 One immediate result was the cancellation of a $40 million beach replacement
project for Galveston. 366 Query: What happens when the oceans rise and/
or land sinks due to human activities? 367
In Texas General Land Office v. Porretto, the Houston First District

Court of Appeals held that a conveyance of beachfront land "to the
meanders" is a grant to the shoreline and does not include submerged
land.36 8 In such a case, the State holds title to the submerged land and
cannot "divest itself of title to any submerged land by facilitating the replenishment of the beaches on that land." 369
In Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, a landowner was denied a permit

by the Edwards Aquifer Authority to pump water from the Edwards Aquifer under his land.3 70 The Texas Supreme Court held as a matter of first
impression that each landowner owns separately, distinctly, and exclusively all groundwater under his land.37 1 This interest in groundwater is
compensable under the takings clause of the Texas Constitution.372 The
supreme court applied the Penn Central takings analysis to determine
that there was a fact issue regarding whether the Edwards Aquifer Authority's regulation was too restrictive of the landowner's rights to the
groundwater without justification in the overall regulatory scheme.373
XIII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, there were a number of significant cases,
some of which are instructive and some of which may cause consternation
to the practitioner. Further, a number of the cases have been criticized
herein and may be subject to further analysis and possible change in the
362. Id. at 723-24.
363. Id. at 724.
364. Id. at 733-34 (Medina, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 741.
366. Id. at 754-55 & n.4 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
367. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 61.001, 61.016, 61.0171, 61.0185 (West 2011 &
Supp. 2013) (directing how to deal with a "meterological event").
368. Tex. Gen. Land Office v. Porretto, 369 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, pet. granted).
369. Id. at 286.
370. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818-21 (Tex. 2012).
371. Id. at 832.
372. Id. at 838.
373. Id. at 838-43 (referring to Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N. Y. City, 438 U.S. 104

(1978)).
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future. In summary, the following legal developments and practical advice are offered from the foregoing cases and analysis:
Constructive notice of a foreclosure was not effective by court record
filings only; however, the Texas Supreme Court, in contradiction of 150
years of Texas law, held a bankruptcy court record represented valid constructive notice. Practitioners need to be very cautious of bankruptcy filings until the constructive notice issue is fully resolved.
A CMBS servicer, with appropriate contractual authority from the
owner of the note and mortgage, has appropriate standing to sue the
debtor under the note and deed of trust.
Drafting precision also came into play in numerous cases, including dismissal of substitute trustees from a lawsuit challenging a foreclosure
sale, 374 as to which parties are third-party beneficiaries of a contract or
commitment,375 and as to prepayment provisions.376 In the lease context,
lack of a specific term led to unintended tenancies-at-will.377 Subcontractors were required to give complete notices,378 and realtors need very
precise and accurate commission agreements to collect.
The award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party has been both clarified and confused. The Texas Supreme Court in Epps found that a defendant could be a prevailing party when the plaintiff nonsuits the case only
if the defendant can prove the nonsuit was taken to avoid an unfavorable
ruling. Other cases, Fitzgeraldand Lesieur, looked to the actual language
of the contract to determine the contract parties' intention for the meaning of "prevailing party." The authors believe that we are likely to see
further clarification and a meshing of these decisions in further cases,
since there is clearly no uniform standard.
Unfortunately, there is still confusion on the issue of whether the "as
is" clause trumps a fraudulent concealment claim and if so under what
circumstances. An announced split of opinion between the Dallas and
San Antonio Courts of Appeals puts the practitioner on warning. The
Texas Supreme Court also examined the issue in a leasing context, together with merger and waiver provisions. The current best practice is
extremely diligent drafting of these provisions and the listing of all known
defects.
Home equity loan disputes continued to move toward a four-year statute of limitations, although the Texas Supreme Court has not addressed
this issue.
The courts continued to wrestle with the characterization of nuisance
and trespass as permanent or temporary, often with seemingly inconsis374. See Marsh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 760 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
375. See Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Commercial, Inc., 348 S.W.3d 894 (Tex.
2011).
376. See Young v. Gumfory, 322 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
377. See Providence Land Servs., LLC v. Jones, 353 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2011, no pet.); Effel v. Rosberg, 360 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
378. See Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc. v. Loeb, 349 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
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tent results. One thing learned, however, is that permits are just a beginning and not a bar, while contests to lawful agricultural operations must
be brought within a year.
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court issued two very important cases dealing with water. First, an avulsive event like a hurricane could not create a
new public easement on the beach. Second, the Texas Supreme Court
applied the rule of capture to groundwater.
Again, there were many cases during the Survey period worthy of reading, analysis, and comment, but space limitation did not permit all to be
addressed. The cases noted herein were significant decisions, some
landmark pronouncements, and others reflections of the continuing struggles in some areas, such as "as is," home equity, and nuisance. Others
offered very important drafting lessons or traps for the unwary.
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APPENDIX A
MATLOCK PLACE APARTMENTS, L.P. V. DRUCE
DISCLAIMER OF RELIANCE
9. LIMITATIONS OF SELLER'S REPRESENTATIONS AND
WARRANTIES EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY
STATED IN THIS CONTRACT, SELLER HEREBY SPECIFICALLY
DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTY, GUARANTY OR REPRESENTATION, ORAL OR WRITTEN, PAST, PRESENT OR FUTURE, OF,
AS TO, OR CONCERNING (I) THE NATURE AND CONDITION
OF THE PROPERTY, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE
WATER, SOIL AND GEOLOGY, AND THE SUITABILITY
THEREOF AND OF THE PROPERTY FOR ANY AND ALL ACTIVITIES AND USES WHICH BUYER MAY ELECT TO CONDUCT THEREON, AND THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OR CONDITIONS THEREON (INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS) OR COMPLIANCE
WITH ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES OR REGULATIONS; (II)
EXCEPT FOR ANY WARRANTIES CONTAINED IN THE DEED
TO BE DELIVERED BY SELLER AT THE CLOSING, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ANY RIGHT-OF-WAY, LEASE, POSSESSION, LIEN, ENCUMBRANCE, LICENSE, RESERVATION,
CONDITION OR OTHERWISE; AND (III) THE COMPLIANCE OF
THE PROPERTY OR ITS OPERATION WITH ANY LAWS, ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS OF ANY GOVERNMENT OR
OTHER BODY. BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT WILL INSPECT THE PROPERTY AND BUYER WILL RELY SOLELY ON
ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE PROPERTY AND NOT ON
ANY INFORMATION PROVIDED OR TO BE PROVIDED BY
SELLER. BUYER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY
WAS OBTAINED FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES AND SELLER
(I) HAS NOT MADE ANY INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OR
VERIFICATION OF SUCH INFORMATION; AND (II) DOES NOT
MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS AS TO THE ACCURACY OR
COMPLETENESS OF SUCH INFORMATION. THE SALE OF THE
PROPERTY AS PROVIDED FOR HEREIN IS MADE ON AN "AS
IS" BASIS, AND BUYER EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT,
IN CONSIDERTAION OF THE AGREEMENTS OF SELLER
HEREIN, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED HEREIN,
SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OR ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY OF
CONDITION, HABITABILITY, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, IN RESPECT OF THE
PROPERTY.
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE LANGUAGE
This Lease, and the attachments, riders and exhibits thereto, constitute
the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter of this Lease. In that regard, all written or oral understandings
and agreements heretofore had or made between the parties are merged
in this Lease and in any other written agreement(s) made between the
parties hereto concurrently herewith and which expressly refer to this
Lease ("Ancillary Agreement(s)"), which Lease and Ancillary Agreement(s) alone fully and completely express the agreement of the parties
with respect to the subject matter hereof and thereof and are entered into
by the parties after full investigation and consideration. In that regard, in
executing this Lease, each party hereto unequivocally represents, acknowledges and states that such party was represented by counsel in the
negotiation and formation of this Lease, and that the negotiation was
conducted by the parties at arm's length.
EACH PARTY HERETO UNEQUIVICALLY REPRESENTS, ACKNOWLEDGES AND STATES THAT THE OTHER PARTY AND
THE OTHER PARTY'S AGENTS, EMPLOYEES AND/OR CONTRACTORS (A) HAVE NOT MADE AND ARE NOT MAKING
ANY WARRANTIES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES OR
STATEMENTS, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, TO INDUCE
SUCH PARTY TO ENTER INTO THIS LEASE EXCEPT TO THE
EXTENT THAT THE SAME ARE EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN
THIS LEASE OR IN ANY OTHER ANCILLARY AGREEMENT,
AND (B) HAD NO AND HAVE NO DUTY TO MAKE ANY DISCLOSURES EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SAME ARE
EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE OR IN ANY OTHER
ANCILLARY AGREEMENT. EACH PARTY HERETO FURTHER
UNEQUIVICALLY REPRESENTS, ACKNOWLEDGES AND
STATES THAT IN ENTERING INTO THIS TRANSACTION AND
EXECUTING AND DELIVERING THIS LEASE TO THE OTHER
PARTY, SUCH PARTY IS (I) NOT RELYING UPON ANY WARRANTIES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES OR STATEMENTS,
WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, MADE BY THE OTHER
PARTY, OR THE OTHER PARTY'S AGENTS, EMPLOYEES OR
CONTRACTORS, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SAME
ARE EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE OR IN ANY
OTHER ANCILLARY AGREEMENT(S), AND (H) EXCEPT TO
THE EXTENT OTHERWISE EXPRESSLY AND SPECIFICALLY
SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE AND/OR THE ANCILLARY AGREEMENT(S), RELYING SOLELY ON ITS OWN INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION AND JUDGMENT.
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EACH PARTY HERETO UNEQUIVICALLY WAIVES, RELEASES, AND DISCLAIMS ANY RIGHT OR ABILITY TO SEEK
TO REVOKE, RESCIND, VACATE, OR OTHERWISE AVOID THE
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THIS LEASE ON THE BASIS OF
ANY ALLEGED FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, MISREPRESENTATION, OR MATERIAL OMISSION BY THE OTHER PARTY OR
THE OTHER PARTY'S AGENTS, EMPLOYEES AND/OR CONTRACTORS, OR ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL
MISTAKE OF FACT OR LAW, OR NEWLY DISCOVERED
INFORMATION.
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